[mm]{&m0wDudk u,fwifMuygpdkY[/mm]

[kernel]

ဧရာဝတီျမစ္အတြင္း ေရႊရွာေဖြမႈေၾကာင့္ ေဒသအတြင္း ဆိုးဆိုးဝါးဝါး ထိခိုက္


ကခ်င္ျပည္နယ္၊ ဗန္းေမာ္ၿမို့နယ္အတြင္းရွိ ဧရာဝတီျမစ္ရိုးတေလ်ာက္ စက္ေလွေတြ ရာနဲ့ခ်ီၿပီး ေရႊရွာေဖြလုပ္ကိုင္ေနရာ အခုအခါ ေဒသအတြင္း သဘာဝပတ္ဝန္းက်င္ ပ်က္စီးကာ ေရထုညစ္ညမ္းမႈေတနြ ့ဲ ေတ႕ြ ၾကုံေနရပါတယ္။
ဧရာဝတီျမစ္ေၾကာငး္ ထိနး္သိမး္ ေရးအတကြ ္ သနၲာေရႊစငက္ ုမၸဏီန့ဲ For Luck ကုမၸဏတီ ို့က ေရတိမပ္ ိုင္းေနရာက သဲ ခမဲ ်ား တးူ ေဖာ္ဖယ္ရွားၿပးီ ကမး္ ေပၚစပု ုံတ့ဲလုပင္ န္း ကန္ထရိုက္ရယူထားရာ အဒဲ ီကုမၸဏီေတကြ ေရႊလုပင္ န္းရငွ ္ေတကြ ို စက္ေလွတစီး တလက်ပ္ ၁ဝ သိနး္ ေကာက္ခံၿပီး အခုႏွစ္ ဧၿပီလတည္းကစလို့ေရႊရွာတ့ဲလုပ္ငနး္ လုပက္ ိုင္ေနခ့ဲတာပါ။
အခုအခါ စက္ေလွ အစီး ၃ဝဝ ေက်ာ္က ေန့ညမျပတ္ ေရႊရွာေနၾကလို့ ျမစ္ေရညစ္ညမ္းကာ ေသာက္သံုးေရေၾကာင့္ လူေတြပါ က်န္းမာေရးထိခိုက္ေနရတယ္လို့ ဗန္းေမာ္ေဒသခံတဦးက ေျပာပါတယ္။

“စက္ေလွအစီးေပါင္း ၃ဝဝ ေက်ာ္ ေန့ေရာ ညေရာ ခုတ္ေတာ့ ရာြ က ေသာက္သုံးေရေတလြ ည္း မသန့္ေတာ့ဘူး။ ေရလယ္ေခါငမ္ ွာ ေရႊက်ငတ္ ့ဲခါက်ေတာ့၊ ျပဒါးေတလြ ည္း သးုံတာကို။ စက္က ေန့ေရာညေရာ ကကို ္ေအာင္ ေမာင္းရတ့ဲခါက်ေတာ့ စကဆ္ ီေတြေရာ၊ အင္ဂ်ငဝ္ ိုင္ေတြေရာ မသန့္ရငွ ္းေတာ့ဘးူ ေလ။ ေရေနာကတ္ ာကတမ်ိဳး၊ စက္ဆီေတပြ ါတာကတမ်ိဳး။ အဒဲ ီမွာေတာ့ ငါးေတဘြ ာေတြေတာ့ မရိွေတာ့ဘူး။ လူေတြပဲ ေသာက္သးုံ ေရ မသန့္ရငွ ္းတ့ဲခါက်ေတာ့ ေရာဂါေတြရၾကရၿပီ။ ျမစ္ေရပဲ ေသာက္ၾကရတာ။ ရြာေတြက တြင္းမရွိဘူး။ ေသာက္သံုးေရ ေသာက္မိတဲ့ခါက်ေတာ့ တခ်ိဳ့ အန္တာတို့၊ ဆရာဝန္သြားျပ အမည္မသိေပါ့။ေရကလည္း ေနာက္တယ္ေလ။ ကမ္းပါးေတြကို ၿဖိုတာေလ တခ်ိဳ့က်ေတာ့။”
ျမစ္လယ္ေခါင္နဲ့ ျမစ္ကမ္းေဘး ကမ္းပါးယံေတြ ၿဖိုခ်ကာ ေရႊက်င္ေနရာ လုပ္ငန္းခြင္အတြင္း ျပဒါး၊ ဆိုင္ယြန္နိုက္အပါအဝင္ အက္ဆစ္တို့အသံုးျပုၿပီး ေရထဲစြန့္ပစ္ေနတာေၾကာင့္ ေရေန သတၲဝါေတြပါ ေသေက်ထိခိုက္ေနရတယ္လို့ ဧရာဝတီျမစ္ေဘး ေက်းရြာသားတဦးက ေျပာပါတယ္။

“သတူ ို့က စက္ေလွေတနြ ့ဲေလ။ စက္ေလွေပၚမွာ ေရႊက်ငတ္ ့ဲစက္တခါတည္း ပါၿပီးသား။ ကုနး္က်ငး္လည္း လုပ္တယ္။ ေလွေပၚကေန ပကို ္န့ဲပက္ထုတ္လိုက္တယ္ဗ်ာ။ ပက္ထုတ္ၿပီး အဲဒီ ျဗံုး(ေျမစာ)ကို စက္ေလွေပၚကို စုပ္တင္လိုက္တာ။ ကမ္းပါးယံေတြကို ေရနဲ့ ပက္ထုတ္ၿပီး က်လာတဲ့ ေျမစာေတြကိုတခါတည္း စက္ေလွေပၚစပု ္တငလ္ ိုက္တာ။ စက္ေလွေပၚမွာ ေရကႊ ်င္တ့ဲဟာက ပါၿပးီသား။ ေရႊက်ငတ္ ့ဲစက္ေတကြ ေတာ္ေတာ္ေလး ႀကီးတယ္။ ျပဒါးသးုံတယ္။ တခ်ိဳ့က်ေတာ့လည္း အက္ဆစ္ေတြ သံုးတယ္။ ဆိုင္ယြန္နိုက္လည္း သံုးတယ္။ အမ်ားအားျဖင့္ ကုန္းေပၚမွာ ခ်က္ကန္ေတြ လုပ္ထားတာ ရွိတယ္။ ဧရာဝတီျမစ္ထဲဖစ္သလို ဒီအတိုငး္ ပဲ ပစ္ေနတာ။ အာဏာပိုင္ အဖ့ဲြအစည္းက ပိုကဆ္ ံရရင္ ၿပးီတာပဲေလ။ က်ေနာ္တို့ရြာက ဧရာဝတီ ကမ္းေဘးနားမွာကို။ ဘာပဲျဖစ္ျဖစ္ လင္းပိုင္ေတြ အခုဆိုရင္ မေတြ႕ေတာ့ဘူး။ ထူးျခားမႈေတာ့ တခါတေလ၂ ပိႆာ ၃ ပိႆာ အရြယ္ ျမစ္ငါးေတြ ေသေနတာ အမ်ားႀကီးပဲ။”
ျမစ္ကမ္းပါးယံေတြၿဖိုခ်ေနတာေၾကာင့္လည္းေကာင္း၊ ျမစ္လယ္ေခါင္အတြင္း ေျမစာေတြ စြန့္ပစ္ရာမွ ျမစ္လယ္ေခါင္ ေသာင္ခံုထြန္းၿပီး ေရစီးေၾကာင္းေတြ ေျပာင္းကာကမ္းပါးေတြ ေရတိုက္စားတာေၾကာင့္လည္းေကာင္း၊ ျမစ္ကမ္းတဖက္နဲ့တဖက္အက်ယ္ဟာ ယခင္က ၃ ဖာလံု ၄ ဖာလံုရွိေနရာမွ အခုအခါ ၁ မိုင္ေက်ာ္အထိက်ယ္ျပန့္လာၿပီး ျမစ္လည္း တိမ္လာတယ္လို့ ဗန္းေမာ္ေဒသခံက ေျပာပါတယ္။
ဒါ့အတြက္ ေရေၾကာင္းသြားလာေရးပါ ထိခိုက္ေနၿပီး ေက်းရြာေတြကို ေရတိုက္စားကာ ျမစ္ကမ္းပါးေတြ ပ်က္စီးေနတယ္လို့ ဗန္းေမာ္ေဒသခံက အခုလို ေျပာပါတယ္။
“ေနြရာသီဆိုရင္ သေဘၤာက ဗန္းေမာ္ထိ လာလို့မရေတာ့ဘူး။ ေညာင္ပင္သာ ဆိုတာ ဗန္ေမာ္နဲ့ ရမိုင္၊ ဂမိုင္ေဝးတဲ့ ေအာက္ထဲမွာ ကပ္ရတာေလ။ ေနာက္ထပ္ တလေက်ာ္လို့ရရိွ င္ ဗနး္ ေမာ္ကို သေဘာၤ လာလို့မရေတာ့ဘူး။ အလဲ ိုမ်ိဳး ေရႊေတြ က်င္တ့ဲအတြက္။ ေနာကတ္ ခါ ဗနး္ ေမာ္ရ့ဲ အထက္ သဖန္းပင္ရြာမွာ ေရႊကို အိမ္ျခံေျမကကြ ္ေတ၊ြ တခ်ိဳ့ဆို စိုကပ္ ်ိဳးေရးလုပတ္ ့ဲဟာကို ကုမၸဏီက ဝယတ္ ာေလ။ ဝယ္ေတာ့ ေရႊေတကြ ်င္တ့ဲအတြက္ ျမစ္က ဗ်က္ၿပဲႀကီးျဖစသ္ ြားေတာ့တာ။ ကမး္ မရိွ ေတာ့ဘးူ ေပါ့ဗ်ာ။ မိုးရာြ လို့ရရိွ င္ ေရတိုးလို့ရိွရင္ ေရေတကြ ရာြ ေတကြ ို စးီတာတို့၊ ေနာကတ္ ခါ ေရတိုက္စားတာတို့။ ေရလယ္က်ြနး္ မွာရိွတ့ဲ မးို စိမး္က်ြန္းရြာဆရို င္ အိမ္ေတြ၊ ကမး္ ပါးေတြ ၿပိုကုန္ၿပီေလ။ ျမစ္အေနာက္ဘက္ကမ္းဆိုလည္း ထီးလင္းတို့၊ နန့္မလင္းတို့ဆိုလည္း ကမ္းပါးေတြ တဝုန္းဝုန္းနဲ့ ေနေရာ ညေရာ ၿပိုက်ေနေတာ့တာ။”
ဧရာဝတီျမစ္ဆံုေဒသမွာလည္း အေစာပိုင္းကာလေတြက ေရႊရွာေဖြတာေတြ အႀကီးအက်ယ္ လုပ္ေနတာေၾကာင့္ သဘာပတ္ဝန္းက်င္ထိခိုက္လာတဲ့အတြက္ မၾကာေသးမီက ေရႊရွာတ့ဲလုပင္ န္းကို အာဏာပိုင္ေတကြ ပတိ ္လကို ္တယဆ္ ိုေပမယ့္ ဗနး္ ေမာ္ေဒသဘကမ္ ွာေတာ့ အခုအခ်ိန္အထိ ေရႊရွာတ့ဲလုပင္ န္းေတြကို တားဆးီတာေတြ မလုပ္နိုင္ေသးပါဘူး။__

@ဒီဗီဘြ ီ

[ThaGeek]

jrpfqHkeJU ygwfoufNyD;awmhyg/ qnf'DZdkif;yHkav;yg ygygw,f/ wifNyD;om;vm;awmh rodbl;/

tjynfhtpHk

[ThaGeek]

uJuJ.... avsmifuD;wdkUuawmh ravsmhao;bl;

[turtle81]

EkdifiHwumrSmvnf; Water, Food, Engergy qkdjyD; awmfawmfav;ukd hot jzpfaeygw,f/
tJh'DtwGufvnf; EkdifiHwum tzGJYtpnf; zGJUjyD; brainstorm awGvkyfaeMuygw,f/

Web Site : http://www.water-energy-food.org/

aemuf ESpf 20?30 avmufrSm ESpfqavmuf wkd;wufvmr,fh vlOD;a&twGuf a&vkdtyfcsuf? pm;p&mvkdtyfcsuf? vSsyfppfvkdtyfcsufawGukd obm0ywf0ef;usifvnf; rxdckdufatmif? vSspfppfyJ&SdyD; pm;p&mr&Sd? a&r&Sdrjzpf&atmif b,fvkd tpDtrHawG vkyfaqmifMurvJqkdwm awmfawmfawmh rvG,fwJh udpfpyg/ 'DMum;xJ &moDOwkawGuvnf; azmufjyefvmEkdifrSKawGukdvnf; xnfhpOf;pm;zkdYuvnf; vkdvmavawmh EkdifiHwumrSm ykdjyD; tajz&Sm&cufae/ wkd;wufjyD; taemufEkdifiHawGrSmawmh ykdufqH&SdMuawmh renewable engergy awGukd okawoeawGvkyfjyD; wGifwGifus,fus,f aps;oufoufomom eJY okH;Ekdifatmif aqmif&Gufaewmukdvnf; awG&Sd&ygw,f/

w&kwfuawmh 'gawGukd odxm;awmh olYEkdifiHtwGif; yJykdifqkkdifwJh pm;p&meJY jrpfa&awG awmh xyfjyD; rzsufpD;csifawmhwJh taetxm;rSm &Sdw,f/ 'gaMumifhvnf; EkdifiHwumykdifwJh rJacgifjrpfay:rSm txufykdif;uaejyD; olUEkdifiHtwGif; impact eJeJyJ &Sdr,fhae&mawGrSm qnfawGaqmuf? vSsyfppfawGxkwf? wjcm;EkdifiHae jrpfatmufykdif;ukd *&krpkdufyJ xifwkdif;usJ/ International River r[kwfwJh jrefrmjynfrSmawmif ykdufqHtm;ukd;eJU xifwkdif; usJzkdY jyif/

'gawGukd tao;pdwf odcsifvkdY a&;xm;wJh pmtkyfav;? bmav;rsm; &Sdrvm;vkdY *l*,fMunfh/ w&kwfjynf&JU vSsyfppfpGrf;tm;vkdtyfcsuf jrifhrm;rSKaMumifh olwkdY EdkifiHrSmawmif jrpfawGay:rSm qnfawG aqmufwJhtaMumif; a&;xm;wJh pmtkyfav;wpftkyfoGm;awGY / 0,fawmh r0,fEkdifao;bl;? pdwf0ifpm;olrsm; 0,fzwfEkdifatmifom &S,fvkdufygw,f/ Abstract zwfMunfh& oavmufawmh jrefrmjynfu jrpfqkHta&;eJY qifwlovkd&Sdaew,f/ pmtkyfrzwfMunfh&ao;awmh aemufqkH;awmh dragon won the angry river jzpfoGm;vm; awmhrod/ pmtkyfacgif;pOfMunfh&oavmufawmh jrpfem;ae w&kwfjynfolawG b,favmufjiif;jiif; dragon won the angry river jzpfoGm;w,f xifw,f/ jrpfqkH ta&;[mvnf; orwMuD;oabmeJYom qkdif;iHhxm;wm trwfawGoabm;rygawmh twnfr,lEkdifao;bl;xifw,f/

China’s meteoric rise to economic powerhouse might be charted with dams. Every river in the country has been tapped to power exploding cities and factories—every river but one. Running through one of the richest natural areas in the world, the Nujiang’s raging waters were on the verge of being dammed when a 2004 government moratorium halted construction. Might the Chinese dragon bow to the "Angry River"? Would Beijing put local people and their land ahead of power and profit? Could this remote region actually become a model for sustainable growth?
Ed Grumbine traveled to the far corners of China’s Yunnan province to find out. He was driven by a single question: could this last fragment of wild nature withstand China’s unrelenting development? But as he hiked through deep-cut emerald mountains, backcountry villages, and burgeoning tourist towns, talking with trekking guides, schoolchildren, and rural farmers, he discovered that the problem wasn’t as simple as growth versus conservation.
In its struggle to "build a well-off society in an all-round way," Beijing juggles a host of competing priorities: health care for impoverished villagers; habitat for threatened tigers; cars for a growing middle class; clean air for all citizens; energy to power new cities; rubber for the global marketplace.
Where the Dragon Meets the Angry River is an incisive look at the possible fates of China and the planet. Will the Angry River continue to flow? Will Tibetan girls from subsistence farming families learn to read and write? Can China and the United States come together to lead action on climate change? Far-reaching in its history and scope, this unique book shows us the real-world consequences of conservation and development decisions now being made in Beijing and beyond.


http://www.amazon.com/Where-Dragon-M.../dp/1597265519


PS. yD'Dtyfvuf0,f&Sdolrsm; &S,fvkdu &S,fay;Muygukef

ww

[turtle81]

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Cambodia's government has approved a controversial hydroelectric dam on a tributary of the Mekong River. The joint venture involves Cambodian, Chinese and Vietnamese investment of $781m (£488m) and is due to be completed within five years. The project in northern Stung Treng province is known as Lower Sesan 2.


Environmental campaigners say the dam will damage the river's biodiversity and devastate the livelihoods and homes of thousands of people. A government statement said the approval came after eight years of study into the possible environmental and social consequences.

It said Prime Minister Hun Sen had ordered new homes to be built for an unspecified number of families who would be resettled for the project. Activist Meach Mean, of the 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN), estimated that more than 50,000 people would be affected by the dam.
He called on the government to organise a public forum to discuss concerns before going ahead.

"We are surprised by the approval," he told AFP news agency.

"We don't know clearly about the process to build the project. We are really concerned about the impact on the people's livelihoods, water, and ecology system."

In September, a report by UN human rights envoy Surya Subedi also raised concerns about the dam, saying communities did not believe they had been adequately consulted about the project.
Damming the Mekong River has causes widespread controversy in South East Asia. Although hydroelectric dams allow countries to generate vast amounts of electricity, they also threaten massive changes to the ecosystem across the Mekong basin. In 1995, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam set up the Mekong River Commission to help manage and co-ordinate use of the river's resources.

source : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20184447
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Mr Viraphonh said he believed that concerns about fish migration and sediment flow had been addressed thanks to modifications to the original dam design costing more than $100m.

----------------------
A formal ceremony marking the start of full construction at Xayaburi would be held on Wednesday, the government said. Countries downstream from the $3.5bn (£2.2bn) dam fear it will affect fish stocks and the livelihoods of millions. The announcement came as leaders from Asia and Europe began a two-day meeting in the Laos capital, Vientiane.

Landlocked Laos is one of South-east Asia's poorest countries and its strategy for development is based on generating electricity from its rivers and selling the power to its neighbours, says the BBC's Jonah Fisher in Bangkok.

Xayaburi is being built by a Thai company with Thai money - and almost all of the electricity has been pre-sold to Thailand, our correspondent says. Countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam point to a report last year that said the project should be delayed while more research was done on the dam's environmental impact. Up to now, Laos had promised not to press ahead while those concerns remained.

Four dams already exist in the narrow gorges of the Upper Mekong in China but until now there have been none on the slower-moving lower reaches of the river, our correspondent says.
Laos deputy energy minister Viraphonh Virawong said work on the Xayaburi dam itself would begin this week, and hoped it would be the first of many.

"I am very confident that we will not have any adverse impacts on the Mekong river," Mr Viraphonh told the BBC. "But any development will have changes. We have to balance between the benefits and the costs."

Mr Viraphonh said he believed that concerns about fish migration and sediment flow had been addressed thanks to modifications to the original dam design costing more than $100m.
Sediment will be allowed out of the bottom of the dam periodically through a flap and lifts, and ladders will help the fish travel upstream.

"We can sense that Vietnam and Cambodia now understand how we have addressed their concerns. We did address this properly with openness and put all our engineers at their disposal. We are convinced we are developing a very good dam," Mr Viraphonh said.

There was no immediate reaction from Cambodia or Vietnam, whose prime ministers are in Laos for this week's Asia-Europe summit. Under the terms of a longstanding agreement on the Mekong, there must be consultation between countries on any development on the river. The US State Department issued a statement expressing concern, despite its recognition of the "important role" dams play in economic growth.

"The extent and severity of impacts from the Xayaburi dam on an ecosystem that provides food security and livelihoods for millions are still unknown," it said.

Environmental campaign group International Rivers said Laos' promise to cooperate with neighbouring countries had never been genuine.

"The project has always continued on schedule and was never actually delayed," the group's Southeast Asia policy coordinator, Kirk Herbertson, told the BBC. "Construction on the project is continuing now because the wet season has ended, not because the environmental studies are completed."

He said experts agreed it was doubtful that fish passages could work on the Mekong and "on the sediments issue, Laos is also jumping to conclusions".

"Laos is playing roulette with the Mekong, and trying to pass its studies off as legitimate science."

Source : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20203072

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Behind Myanmar’s suspended dam (1)
By Qin Hui

After the decision to shelve a China-funded hydropower plant on the Irrawaddy River caused uproar in Beijing, Qin Hui set off south to learn about the project and its opponents. He opens a three-part article.

On a recent trip to Myanmar – also known as Burma – my eyes were opened to the strength of opposition to the Myitsone dam, the China-led scheme in the northern state of Kachin suspended last September after more than a year of construction.

Groups usually positioned against each other across ethnic, religious or political lines on this issue appear united. Burmese or Kachin; existing regime or opposition; religious or secular; Christian or Buddhist; pro-West, pro-military or pro-China political factions – almost all agree that the government was right to shelve the project at the source of the Irrawaddy River.

This is not to say that the dam, a project of China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), has no supporters whatsoever. After all, the junta, which governed the country in a military dictatorship from 1962 until the 2010 general election, was originally a firm advocate of the scheme. Indeed, it pushed not just for the Miyitsone dam, but for a cascade of seven hydropower plants on the Irawaddy River.

But anyone familiar with Burmese politics will know that the military government suffered periodic factional disputes throughout its rule, a dynamic that was crucial to kick-starting the current reform period. And, among those internal disagreements was a dispute over Myitsone.

Former head of state Than Shwe was replaced last year by the first civilian president in nearly 50 years, Thein Sein. Though the nominal civilian government is still backed by the military, Than Shwe has seen his clique undermined and its voice weakened. The general’s supporters have failed to speak out in favour of the Myitsone dam, and even state newspaper New Light of Myanmar has published criticisms of the scheme.

Kachin state, where the majority of residents are members of the Kachin ethnic group, is home to a strong, separatist movement, led by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). The organisation opposes the military-backed government and a de-facto state of war exists between the two parties. For many years, the KIO has acted as an autonomous local government, controlling most of the state, where it manages public order and economic development.

Unlike the NGO community, the KIO has in the past supported hydropower development. The KIO-governed Kachin State 2nd Special Region, for example, once turned to its only international neighbour, China, for help in this area. In fact, it was the KIO that first attracted Chinese investors to the region’s hydropower potential.

But the friendship didn’t last. Certain Chinese companies, preferring to cosy up to the more powerful Myanmar government, cast the KIO aside, causing the angry separatists to change their stance on several projects. A dam on the Tarpein River was one such scheme. The KIO had collaborated with China’s Datang Corporation on the project and provided some of the funding. But when the military government intervened, Datang changed allegiance, forcing the KIO out. In order to “protect the project”, government soldiers were dispatched to occupy the area around the dam, leaving the Kachin down on both land and money – and not at all happy about it.

In response, the KIO decided to obstruct the project, and the scheme is now paralysed. But it is important to note that the rebels are not opposed to a dam on the Tarpein itself, merely to the involvement of the Myanmar government.

The Myitsone Dam is a different case, however. While the KIO is by no means “anti-dam”, and was once keen to work with China on hydropower, it has never been in favour of the Myitsone project.
Even the Kachin faction closest to the Myanmar government opposes to the dam. The New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) turned itself from a communist militia into a “border guard force” under the aegis of the military government. Its former leader, Zahkung Tingying, suppressed internal dissent with junta help and ended up as nothing but a puppet of Than Shwe. But even he has never spoken out in favour of the Myitsone project, while other NDA-K figures have been explicit in their opposition. When I spoke to former deputy commander of the NDA-K Wu Maoyin [pinyin transliteration of Burmese name], he described the Myitsone Dam as the single largest source of public discontent with Chinese investment.

The Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) is an influential religious organisation in the region. I asked one of its senior members, Brother Kunsang, if there were cultural or religious reasons to oppose the dam, in addition to environmental and economic factors: “Obviously, being a Christian, I don’t believe there are any spirits residing at Myitsone. But as a Kachin, I see it as a symbol of our national spirit. That does not contradict my Christianity,” he said. “If the junta and Chinese companies come along and want to make money from it without even consulting us, of course I’ll object, even if it doesn’t damage the environment.”
Myanmar’s ethnic Chinese come from a range of backgrounds: some originate from the mainland, some from the Kuomintang army (many of whose ranks fled to Myanmar after being expelled from China by the Communists) and some are members of the ethnically Chinese Wa and Kokang groups. But there is a common thread: overall, Myanmar’s ethnic Chinese population is comparatively successful and rich. Its members prefer to keep their heads down and make money, rather than getting involved in politics.

The growth in trade between Myanmar and China has provided many ethnic Chinese with the chance to get wealthy, and they have not wasted these opportunities. The beneficiaries of these ties do whatever is necessary to maintain friendly relations with both the military government and China – and to keep a distance from anything the two governments might find objectionable. As a result, they are unlikely to discuss the Myitsone dam. When they do, however, they say it has not been handled well. Even members of the ethnic Chinese elite, who have the closest links with government, feel this way.
Li Zuqing, head of the Confucius Institute in Mandalay, is one example. He has always identified with China and approves of both the Chinese and Myanmar governments. But Li told me that, while he believes China has done many good things for Myanmar over the decades, the country has made “two clear mistakes”. One was encouraging ethnic Chinese students in Myanmar to become Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. The other is the Myitsone dam: “I don’t know whose stupid idea it was,” he said. “They could have built it anywhere, and they had to build it right where it would be most taboo.”

So why is the Myitsone dam so unpopular?
Opponents of the dam say it will damage the environment, impact fisheries, flood wide swaths of jungle and change the river flow downstream. And, since it is built on a geological fault, they argue it could collapse if an earthquake strikes.

There are good reasons for many of these concerns. But they also call for qualifying remarks.
First, this list of objections could apply to almost any dam. We cannot, however, rule out dam construction entirely. Instead, we need to work out the pros and the cons and identify suitable sites: if it isn’t possible to build one here, where is it possible? Where would the damage be smallest? Alternative proposals are needed. Certain environmental groups appear capable only of saying where dams cannot go – and not where they can. While these NGOs do have a role to play, we cannot rely solely on their advice about any specific project.

Second, some of the issues raised by opponents can be resolved through design changes, further investment or extra equipment. This doesn’t have to be an all-or-nothing choice between the original proposal and no dam at all. Moreover, some of the problems flagged up are not as serious as they are made out to be. The main dam at Myitsone is designed as a concrete-face rock-fill dam, a type of barrage with a much shallower slope and wider base than arch or gravity dams, which rely on a steep narrow wall. Such dams are less prone to earthquake damage. Even if the Myitsone were damaged, there is virtually no chance of a sudden collapse; any failure would pan out over a period of time.

Third, opposition to dams can be contradictory. If the area to be flooded is sparsely-populated, it is described as a unique virgin ecosystem, which must not be touched. If it is densely populated, however, the problems of relocating local residents are played up. The outcome is that no matter what the population, the dam cannot be built. These two concerns need to be balanced.
Something else struck me during my visit to Kachin state: although environmental damage is the concern most prominently voiced by opponents to the dam, it is not the real reason they fight it.
Everywhere in Kachin, you see photos or paintings of Myitsone, the confluence of the Mail and N'Mai rivers and source of the Irrawaddy. The iconic image is visible in any public space and is a familiar sight even in non-Kachin areas (a “Myitsone Restaurant” near the Chinese embassy in Yangon is adorned with the image). It seems that Myitsone is to this region what Mount Fuji is to Japan or Mount Kumgang to North Korea: an emblem of the nation.

Why is this place so significant? Kachin legend has it that Father Dragon and his two sons, Hkrai Nawng and Hkrai Gam, were born here. Locals believe that, if the mountains are damaged, the dragons will awaken and bring disaster. Of course, many people don’t believe this, but the point is the Kachin do – and this is their land isn’t it?
Besides, there are historic reasons for considering this a special place. When the people of the Tibeto-Burman language family (which includes the Burmese and the Kachin) migrated south from the Tibetan plateau, this is where they entered the Irrawaddy valley, emerging from the precipitous mountains to found a new civilisation.

Even if you dismiss the legends, the Kachin have cause to revere Myitsone as the birthplace of their culture.

I wondered why the dam threatens this special status. “Myitsone will still be there, whether the dam is built or not. Won’t it still be sacred even if there is a new reservoir?” I asked Kata, a local writer.

No, said Kata. “We cannot accept this happening to Myitsone.” He paused. “It isn’t like Jerusalem or Mecca. We Kachin don’t have buildings as symbols of our faith; we revere Myitsone in its natural state. If there was a reservoir here, then it wouldn’t be Myitsone.

“If they have to create a reservoir, why does it have to be here? They didn’t even consult us. A few Burmese generals and Chinese bosses say do it, and it’s done?”

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Behind Myanmar’s suspended dam (2)

China’s resolve not to interfere in its neighbour’s “internal affairs" rings hollow: the country has played a formative role in Burmese history, writes Qin Hui.

Everything I heard in Myanmar pointed to a failure to consult as the key issue in the furore surrounding the Myitsone dam. As Brother Kunsang of the Kachin Baptist Convention said, “If the junta and Chinese companies come along and want to make money from it without even consulting us, of course I’ll object.”

Myitsone is sacred, but does that mean nobody is allowed to build there? Even the Kachin aren’t united on this point. A new Buddhist pagoda, a church and some basic tourist facilities already stand at the confluence of the two rivers. But if Myanmar’s government was to seal off Myitsone, remove local residents and hand the area over to an official tourism company – which in turn contracted operations out to a foreign firm – then, just as with the dam, there would be widespread opposition.

A friend told me that, in the past, Myitsone wasn’t as well known as it is today, and the image of the two rivers flowing around the mountain was less common a sight. Its current popularity is in part a reaction to the behaviour of the military government and the Chinese firms. Myitsone is not just the birthplace of the Kachin, to an extent it has become a symbol of Kachin resistance and dignity.

The Kachin people see a military government known for despotism and corruption taking their land, clearing them from their homes with only minimal compensation and then handing that land over to a foreign dam company, who will operate the site for 50 years and export 90% of the electricity generated. The company will of course make significant contributions to the government, but what does that have to do with the Kachin people? Their experience of the government is of massacre and pillage, not the provision of welfare.

The Myitsone is not as important to the ethnic Burmese as it is to the Kachin. But as the source of the Irrawaddy River, it still holds certain symbolic value. The Kachin see the Myanmar government as the “invader”, and the recent reforms show the Burmese were far from enamoured with the junta themselves. The benefits of the deal for the government are not automatically good news for the people. And so the project is unpopular with both Kachin and Burmese.

The Chinese company says the project is a Sino-Burmese partnership, and that the Burmese partner has to be the government – it could not work with the opposition or “ethnic militias”. It points out that the military government agreed to let China operate the dam for 50 years, in return for which China would provide appropriate recompense, and that this is a normal and fair deal between two nations which benefits both parties. As for how the government recompenses the locals, that is an “internal affair”.

But the situation in Kachin state, which would host the dam, is unusual. The Chinese government has, over many decades, exerted a huge influence on northern Myanmar.
Myanmar is a multi-ethnic state, and the Mon, Shan and Burmese peoples have all at one time or another presided over strong kingdoms within its present-day territory. But they have never controlled the whole of northern Burma, and in particular the Kachin areas. When China and Myanmar started to form an international relationship in the modern sense, Myanmar was a British colony. But China and pro-Chinese indigenous peoples opposed British rule, and there was no fixed border.

In 1914, the British proposed the McMahon Line as the boundary between China and their two colonies, Myanmar and India. But the Chinese – still claiming rights to land it had formerly possessed, stretching as far as Myitsone – rejected the proposal. However, in 1960, China and Myanmar formally recognised the Burmese section of the line.

The Japanese invasion of China, and later Myanmar, brought further changes. Cut off from the sea, China relied heavily on land routes through Myanmar and was forced by the British (not yet at war with Japan) to accept the “1914 Line”, demarcating the north of the Shan State. Later, as the United States and Britain joined the war and Japan invaded Myanmar, Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist Chinese forces entered the country, commanded by US general Joseph Stilwell. It was a period of rapid change for Myanmar. For a while, Chinese forces were in actual control of the bulk of disputed territory and, after the war, China retained significant influence.

While the Kachin army fought bravely against Japan, the Burmese nationalists misread the situation and allied with Japan, hoping to gain independence from Britain. This brought them into conflict with China, Britain, the Kachin and other ethnic groups of northern Myanmar. That history was not easily forgotten and the ethnic Burmese later struggled to inherit British power – power that was, in any case, much reduced after the war.

This led the Burmese nationalist politicians to advocate one of two strategies: one, use a loose federal system to devolve power to ethnic minorities in exchange for their support for the federal state. Or two, play the “Chinese card” and use Chinese support to control northern Myanmar.
Revolutionary general Aung San himself supported the federal approach and, in 1947, prior to independence, signed the Panglong Agreement with a number of ethnic groups. This agreement allowed for a large degree of self-governance and the option to withdraw from the federation after a decade. That agreement forms the legal basis for demands for self-governance today. Tragically, Aung San was assassinated shortly after that agreement was signed and it was never implemented, to the fury of the ethnic minorities.

Aung San’s successors, including U Nu, the country’s first prime minister, turned to China, hoping to use the strength of the new Chinese Communist regime to eliminate the remnants of the Chinese nationalists in northern Myanmar. Myanmar became the first non-communist state to recognise the People’s Republic of China and China, at the time in desperate need of recognition, was grateful. In the border negotiations of the late 1950s and early 1960s China basically accepted Burmese sovereignty over the majority of disputed territory, sticking to the McMahon and 1941 lines. Only Pianma and Banhong – locations remembered in China for acts of anti-British resistance – were kept on China’s side of the map.

So the border disputes were resolved. And, if both countries had stayed out of each other’s business, that might have been an end to it. But in the 1960s China, having just put an end to the campaign of cross-border harassment by the remnants of the nationalist army hiding in Myanmar, provided the Burmese Communists with manpower and weapons for their revolution. The Communist “People’s Army” was quickly defeated, however, and fled to the Chinese border. At the time, these were Myanmar’s largest anti-government forces, and they are the predecessors of several of today’s militias.
Conflict between the battle-hardened ethnic generals in the north and the Burmese communist chiefs intensified. The international climate changed: in particular, the start of China’s reform period led to a break with the Burmese communists and the restoration of relations with the Burmese government. The communists weakened and, by 1989, had disbanded. But neither China nor the Burmese government dealt with the situation well. The communists evolved into militias, which have never had good relations with the federal government.

The strongest of the ethnic militias in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army, is also most closely connected with the Mytisone problem. The KIA; its political wing the Kachin Independence Organisation; and the Kachin Independence Council (KIC) which governs the region, were not formed from the remnants of the communists – they have always flown a Kachin nationalist flag.
In Chinese eyes, the Kachin appear the most westernised of north Myanmar’s ethnic groups: they are mostly Christian, use a Latin script created by western missionaries and are more likely to speak English than other ethnic groups. And so KIO opposition to the dam was blamed by many Chinese on “western anti-Chinese interference”. This is a grave misunderstanding.

The political figures I spoke to in Kachin state were all members of factions close to the government, or from a communist background. Given the ongoing conflict, I was unable to speak directly to anyone in the KIO. But even these non-KIO members poured scorn on the idea that the KIO is in any way “western”.

They said that many of the founding members of the KIO were actually Marxists and closer to China than the west. But when they founded the Kachin Communist Party and looked to China for support, they were told that, as a matter of “organisational principle”, a nation could only have one Communist Party. If they wanted support, they would have to merge with the Burmese Communist Party. But the Kachin were unwilling to sign up with the Burmese. And, with China opposing the foundation of a Kachin Communist Party, they had to change their name. The Kachin Independence Organisation was born.

Back then, the Burmese Communist Party was proclaiming – at least outside of the party – that it would implement ethnic autonomy after victory. And so the KIO fell into line and obtained Chinese support and military aid indirectly, through the communists. The areas controlled by the KIA in Kachin state and the north of Shan state run alongside the Chinese border, and the KIO has made Laiza, an important border town subject to strong Chinese influence, its headquarters. It would be more accurate to say that the KIO has a Chinese background than a western one.

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2002
Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc (KEPCO of Japan) builds a weather station in Tang Hpre (Damming the Irrawaddy).
February 2002
The Ministry of Electric Power forms the Department of Hydroelectric Power (DOHP) (Damming the Irrawaddy).

January 2004
Villagers from affected areas send a letter to the Kachin Consultative Body and Kachin ceasefire groups asking them to stop the Myitsone dam projects (Damming the Irrawaddy). KEPCO does research in dam area with agreement of DOHP

1 February 2004
Villagers send a letter to the northern regional commander Kyaw Win asking him to halt the dam projects in Myitsone but he does not respond to them.

24 October 2005
A state electronic engineer informs the Northern Regional Commander Ohn Myint and chairman of the Kachin State peace and development council in Myitkyina about the camp near the dam site for 8 Chinese researchers from the Yunnan Machinery [Equipment] Export & Import Company (YMEC) and Kunming Hydropower Institute of Design.

30 November 2005
YMEC and Myanmar Ministry of Electric Power sign a Memorandum of Understanding in Kunming.

May 2006
Heavy rain and snow run-runoff back up behind Washawng dam and break it apart, resulting in a sudden flood.

1 June 2006
Northern Regional Commander Ohn Myint informs the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Relations Office, Special Region 2, and the National Democratic Army-Kachin (NDAK) Special Region 1, asking them to tell their subordinates that Suntac Technologies Co. Ltd has been employed by YEMC [Yunnan Machinery] company in Yunnan to survey and explore drilling projects.

August 2006
Suntac establishes an office in Tang Hpre village to map the terrain for YMEC, and an office in Washawng to transport machinery from China that it needs for mapping (Damming the Irrawaddy, 2007).

December 2006
Signing of MoU on hydro-power-electricity between Ministry of Electric Power (1) and China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) involving Myitsone and Chibwe dams; first mapping, hydrology, and test drilling occurs in watershed.

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