xkdif;wyfrawmftaMumif; odaumif;p&m

[blueflame]

M60 Patton Tank




American ekdifiH Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant, Chrysler u 1960 rSmpwifxkwfvkyfygw,f/'Dwihfum;[m M47/M48 Patton Tank udk tqifhjrSifhxm;wmjzpfygw,f/tav;csdef 50-60 tons,t&Snf 22.79'(6.94 m),tus,f 11.92' (3.6 m),tjrifh 10.54' (3.2 m) &dSwJh 'Dwifhudk crew 4 a,mufarmif;ESif&ygw,f/Engine power 750 hp &dSwJhContinental AVDS-1790-2 V12 air cooled, twin turbocharged diesel engine udkoHk;xm;wJhtwGuf jrefESkef; 30 mph (48 km/h) jzifharmif;ESifEdkifygw,f/150 mm (6.12") &dSwJusnfum udktoHk;jyKxm;ygw,f/
main gun taeeJ h105 mm (4.1") M68 gun ESifh .50 (12.7 mm) M85,
7.62 mm machine gun wdk hudkwyfqifxm;ygw,f/awmufavsmuf wdkufyGJ0if tuGmta0; uawmh
300 miles (480 km) yg/ 1995 rSm 53 pD;pwif0,f,lcJhNyD;awmh 2000 rSm 127 pD;ESifh 2003 rSm 178 pD;pD0,f,lcJhygw,f/

Credit to Original Uploader

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usaemfvnf;vdkuf&Smwm 105 mm (4.1") M68 gun &J htuGma0;udkrawG hrdbl;As udk,dk;'ajymovdk jzpfrSmyg usaemfu Translation raumif;vdk hrSm;oGm;wmjzpfEdkifygw,f/tm;vHk;udk awmif;yefygw,f/

[botchan]

xkdif;bk&ifhavwyfrawmf &[wf,mOfwyfzGJU

xkdif;bk&ifhavwyfrawmfu &[wf,mOfwyfzGJUxJrSm 0gt&ifhqHk; AD,uferfppfvufusef HUEY &[wf,mOfrsm;jzpfygw,f/ rMumcifuyJ in service ESpf40jynfhtcrf;tem;usif;ycJhygao;w,f/
S-76 HUEY



LYNX-300



UH-60 BLACK HAWKS



AH-1W SEA COBRA


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All Credits go to Original Uploaders & Photographers

[wasabi]

M60 Patton Tank


main gun taeeJ h105 mm (4.1") M68 gun ESifh .50 (12.7 mm) M85,
7.62 mm machine gun wdk hudkwyfqifxm;ygw,f/ypfcwfEdkifwJ tuGmta0;uawmh
300 miles (480 km) yg/ 1995 rSm 53 pD;pwif0,f,lcJhNyD;awmh 2000 rSm 127 pD;ESifh 2003 rSm 178 pD;pD0,f,lcJhygw,f/

Credit to Original Uploader

udkbvl; wifhawGtaMumif;tckvdkwifay;wJhtwGuf aus;Zl;wifygw,fcifAsm/
usaemfwpfckavmufar;csifvdk.yg/ teDeJjyxm;wm[m ypfcwfEdkifwJhtuGma0;vm; vSKyf&Sm;oGm;vmEdkifwJh tuGmta0ygvm;cifAsm/ rsm;aomtm;jzifh 105 rr wifhtajrSmufu 105 udkuf ypfcwfEdkifw,fvdk.rSwfom;bl;vdk.yg/ ( usaemfrSwfxm;wm rSm;Edkifygw,f/ tckjyefvdkuf&Smwm rawG.vdk.yg/ )

[MrYoDa]

wifhum;&J range udk wyfxm;wJh tajrmuf &JY range eJY trSwfrSm;wm jzpfygvdrfhr,f/ awmufavsmuf wdkufyGJ0if tuGmta0;vdkY jyef&if &Edkifr,f xifygw,f/

[botchan]

xkdif;EkdifiHumuG,fa&;odyÜHESifhenf;ynm&Hk;rS ynmonfxkdif;ppfonfrsm;u xkdif;a'ocHtajcaeESifh vkdufavsmnDaxGatmif jyifqifwDxGifvkdufonfh AHk;uRrf;usifolrsm;twGuf AHk;aygufuGJrI tumuG,f0wfpHkonf xkdif;wyfrawmf\ t"du wDxGifrIqkdif&m qkwHqdyfukd &&SdcJhygonf/



tqkdyg AHk;'PfcH0wfpHkonf 12uDvkd*&rftav;csdef&Sdygonf/ EkdifiHwum pHcsdefpHnTef;rsm;ESifhtnD jzpfNyD; cg;? ajcaxmufESifh vnfyif;ykdif;wGif jyKjyifajymif;vJrIrsm;jyKvkyfcJhaMumif; tqkdyg&Hk;rS AkdvfrSL;csKyf Jirachai Kiattiprajaksa u ajymygonf/

]]usaemfwkdU 0wfpHku EkdifiHwumpHawGrDw,f/ 'gayr,fh aps;EIef;u oufomw,f/ wpfpHkudk baht 80000 yJusoifhw,f/ usaemfwkdU'gukd rvkyfEkdifcifwkef;u EkdifiHjcm;uwifoGif;cJh&wm/ wpfpHkudk baht 2.35 million awmifukefuscJhw,f/ NyD;awmh xkdif;yif&if;ypönf; 60%awmif xnfhoGif;toHk;jyKxm;w,f}} olu qufajymygonf/

trsdK;om; wDxGifrIqkwHqdyfrsm;teuf vlrIwDxGifrIqkwHqdyfukd qGwfcl;cJhygonf/ pwkw¬tBudrfajrmuf NydKifyGJokdU wifoGif;cJhaom wDxGifrIqkdif&m tr,faygif; 407ckudk ausmfjzwftEkdif&cJhjcif;jzpfygonf/

tck0wfpHkonf yHkrSef0wfpHkrsm;xuf cg;? vnfyif;ESifh ajcaxmufrsm;udk ykdrkdumuG,frIay;EkdifNyD; ukd,fwkdif;rSmvnf; xkdif;ppfonfrsm;ESifh tH0if*Gifus jzpfaMumif; od&ygonf/

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All Credits go to Original Uploaders & Photographers

[botchan]

'DyHkawGu S-76 HUEY &[wf,mOfrsm;&JU in service ESpf40jynfhtxdrf;trSwfyGJuav;u yHkawGyg/

-----------------------------------------
All Credits go to Original Uploaders & Photographers

[botchan]

ASSAWIN

ASSAWIN 7JU teD;uyfyHkaumif;av;awG awGUvkdU wifay;vkdufygw,f/

-----------------------------------------
All Credits go to Original Uploaders & Photographers

[botchan]

udkabmha&....

jrefrmeJUxdkif; e,fpyfrSm ppfa&;jycJhwkef;u xkdif;bufu a[mif0SpfqmawGeJUcsdefxm;w,fqdkvm; rSwfom;cJhzl;ayr,fh....
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vufeuf&JU usnfqHudku 4 aycefU&SdjyD; pay:cgpu usnfxdk;xnfhzdkU...
ppfonf tenf;qHk; 3 OD;vdktyfw,fqdkwmvnf; Mum;zl;ygw,f...

ukdbDtkdZufa&

'DvifhrSm awGU&wJh atmufu aqmif;yg;twkdif;qkd&ifawmh udkbDtkdZufar;wm GCN-55s awGjzpfr,fAs/ tJ'Daqmif;yg;xJrSm tJ'DtjzpfysufwpfckvHk;udk &Sif;jyxm;ygw,f/

The Battle at Border Post 9631

How much is the situation in Myanmar dependable on actions of country’s neighbours, but also how complex the situation in that country meanwhile is (in regards to relations between the regime, drugs, and different rebel organizations) was perfectly illustrated by a series of sharp clashes between Burma and Thailand, in February 2001.

In order to support the UWSA in its fight against the SSA, and help it establish the full control of the areas along the border to Thailand, the Myanmar Army launched an operation that was to result in the fighting with Thai military as well. While the Myanmar regime would not comment about these operations, meanwhile it is known that the fiercest series of battles was fought for the Thai Border Post 9631, mounted on a hilltop one kilometre inside Thailand, at Ban Pang Noon, in the Mae Fae Luang district, on approach to the Mae Sai, a city some 440 miles away from Bangkok, in the northernmost tip of Thailand. The exact reasons for the attack on this border post remain unclear: some Thai sources indicated that the Myanmaris attacked the Border Post 9631 – garrisoned by 20 Tahan Pran Militia troops – either “by accident”, while pursuing Shon guerrilla, or in order to get a good fire-base for their artillery attacks against the nearby Shon positions. It is interesting to note, however, that this attack came on the evening of Friday, 9 February 2001, when most of the Thai military was on a leave. In fact, the unofficial sources within the Thai Army indicated that the attack was undertaken by no less but 900 Myanmar troops and 600 UWSA militiamen, and that its objective was to remove the Thais from a position from which the Myanmaris could smuggle drugs into Thailand. In the past, namely, the local commander of the Tahan Pran was several times offered money to let their convoys with drugs pass, but he refused all such offers (in fact, he should have told the Myanmaris to, “go feed fish” with their opium).

Regardless the backgrounds, the Tahan Pran detected the approaching Myanmaris in time and put up stiff resistance, holding out for four hours, killing 14 out of some 200 Myanmari attackers, and injuring another 30, while losing two dead and eleven wounded. After almost running out of ammunition, however, they had to pull out and the Post 9631 fell into Myanmari hands. Having taken all their injured with them, the Tahan Pran were relatively easy to pursue by the enemy, and a short running engagement developed until the 3rd Cavalry Regiment of the Thai 1st Armoured Division started a rescue effort. Having the Post 9631 in their hands, the Myanmaris actually needed no more fighting, but their intention was to use the post and the surviving Tahan Prans as a bait for a trap they attempted to set up for any intervening Thai unit. As the Tahan Pran held out longer than anticipated, however, their plan was spoiled, as instead of deploying their troops on the flanks on the main threat route, the Myanmaris were forced to involve their reservers in the fighting.

On 10 February, the Thai 3rd Cavalry Regiment assembled a battalion-sized task force from a part of a mechanized infantry battalion armed with M-113A-3 APCs, an infantry company and a company of M-60A-3 MBTs. The unit was put under command of Capt. Songkarn Nilphan, and instantly sent on its way. Approaching Mae Sai on the same evening, the Nilphan’s force counterattacked the Myanmaris that were still busy fighting the Tahan Prans. The Cavalry charged forward, hitting the enemy hit very hard, forcing them to retreat back towards the border, leaving 17 dead and 60 injured behind. The Thais had only seven wounded.

On the morning of 11 February, the Myanmar Army responded in strength, deploying three regiments supported by Chinese-supplied T-69 tanks and artillery into an attack against Mae Sae, the local military Headquarters, and the adjacent satellite communications site. The Thais first concentrated on repulsing the main column, engaging T-69s with their M-60A3s, and subsequently by RTAF F-5s, which flew several strikes armed with LGBs, after starting from the Chiang Mai AB. Later on Sunday, Thai forces were reinforced by some self-propelled artillery (M-109s) and several batteries of even more powerful guns, including some GCN-55s, and the remaining two Myanmar columns were stopped as well, after suffering some heavy losses in dead, injured and captured soldiers. While the whole 3rd Thai Army was mobilizing and deploying reinforcements towards Mae Sai, the RTAF continued mounting intensive strikes, hitting Myanmar positions and supply columns. Late on Sunday afternoon, the final counter-attack by Thai troops drove Myanmaris out of Thailand, re-capturing the Border Post 9631. There an injured Tahan Pran officer - previously assumed dead - was found alive.

A Royal Thai Army V-150 Com*mando vehicle deployed on the streets of Mae Sae in January 2001, at the time of "border incidents" with Myanmar. (Albert Grandolini collection)

Meanwhile, the fighting between Thai and Myanmari forces was reported also from a hill some two miles west of the city of Thachilek, which is separated by a canal from Mae Sai. Also, a RTAF UH-1H helicopter underway on a supply mission over Mae Aye was damaged by gunfire from the ground and forced to land. The crew was not injured.

At 19:30h local time, a cease-fire was agreed. This was generally accepted, but sporadic fighting continued as the Myanmaris were bringing in 2.000 fresh troops from Kengtung to Tachilek, together with some heavy weapons. Especially the artillery was involved in the sense of duels over the border and some additional strikes by RTAF aircraft. The RTAF Chian Mai AB was the main base for all Thai air operations during this battle, and the Royal Thai Air Force units deployed there proved highly successful in operations against Myanmar. RTAF fighters have flown up to 70 combat sorties between 10 and 12 February, including a LGB-strike against a Myanmar artillery battery placed on the Golf course at Thachilek. This mission was flown by one F-5F and three F-5Es. The F-5F was equipped with the Israeli Litening nav/attack and designation pod: the WSO in the F-5F designated the target, while his pilot tried to fly steady – while remaining out of range of air defences. The three F-5Es closed from different sides at a high speed and tossed two six 2.000pds Paveway LGBs each into the acquisition basket before disappearing the other way. The Myanmar anti-aircraft fire was reported as "light", and none of Thai aircraft was hit or damaged. According to Thai sources, except for at least a dozen of Myanmar troops, at least five civilians were killed and ten injured during this attack as well.


Two RTAF F-5Es seen displayed with an asortiment of US-made bombs, including GBU-16s and LITENING-pods - during a graduation ceremony in 2001. The same aircraft and weapons were used against the Myanmari troops. (Albert Grandolini collection)


No Tandaw Lay in the Air

The RTAF F-5E/Fs were completely refurbished in the early 1990s, getting a Litton INS, and having their structure strengthened by a centreline pylon capable to carry 1.500kg, inner underwing pylons with payload of 1.000kg, and outer underwing pylons with payload of 500kg. During the operations against Myanmar, their usual warload consisted of two LGBs carried under inner pylons and two wingtips, but no drop tanks. Some pilots described their aircraft as "difficult to handle" and "ponderous" when loaded that way, and the response to control-inputs as "very slow" (probably due to the change of the centre of gravity), but otherwise no other restrictions were experienced.

On the other side, the TL failed to show during the crisis. At the time the regime in Rangoon officially claimed to that a squadron of Israeli-upgraded F-7s would be deployed to support the ground forces in the area along the Thai border: in fact, the junta ordered all the three F-7-units to deploy. Theoretically, in this way the TL was to concentrate at least 30 fighters against Thailand. However, in effect only six fighters were made operational and indeed deployed to Kengtung AB, some 150km north of Tachilek (opposite Mai Sai District in Thailand): this was actually on the verge of the F-7’s range when loaded with weapons and ammunition, and definitely a very poor performance. Worse was yet to come: when RTAF F-5s started hitting targets inside Myanmar with LGBs, the TL F-7s never appeared at all. Of the remaining aircraft, at the time of this clash the TL had some 17 PC-7s, four PC-9s, and four G-4 Super Galebs, some 50% of which were operational on average. The condition of the A-5Ms was even poorer than that of the F-7s, and the number of remaining operational helicopters too. Essentially, Myanmar had no air force to show at the time.

The Myanmari air defences also failed to prevent RTAF fighters from repeatedly hitting their targets: although the Army purchased at least 100 SA-16 Gimlet/Igla 1E MANPADs already in 1998 from Bulgaria, there were no reports about their use in combat. Obviously, the RTAF was in possession of air superiority during this clash. Without surprise, on 19 June 2001 Rangoon reported that Burma ordered ten MiG-29 fighters from Russia, including two one-seaters and two two-seaters, woth $130 million in total (30% of which were to be paid immediately, and the rest over the following ten years). The Burmese MiG-29s, which so far were never seen in the public, were drawn from a park of some 70 Fulcrums built in the late 1980s and early 1990s for Iraq and Syria, but never delivered, instead being stored at the Lukhovitsy Machine Building Plant. How much are the TL’s MiG-29 capable to offset RTAF’s superiority remains questionable, however, especially given the condition of the Myanmar Air Force at the time and ever since. Namely, by early 2002 reports from Meikhtila AB became known about TL’s pilots resigning in droves. Supposedly, the main reason was the low quality of the equipment they've got from China (foremost the F-7s and A-5s): most of the aircraft were inoperational and parked in their hangars for 99% of the time, and the arrogant behaviour of the Chinese technicians and instructors stationed in Myanmar (together with their families) to maintain these jets was the reason of severe complaints. Several AF pilots which resigned actually accused the Chinese of inserting their intelligence officers into the TL instead of sending them to help.
Another reason for many officers resigning was the purchase of the MiG-29s. Most of the higher officers of the TL were against the purchase of the MiG-29s from Russia, and instead wanted the TL to get Mirage 2000s or Su-27. This finally caused - just for example - a fierce quarrel between the CO of the Wing stationed at Meikhtila and his superiors. He was explaining that MiGs - which were initially built for Iraq - cost too much for no worth in exchange, and were sitting over ten years in storage. Besides, so he supposedly said, MiG-29s couldn't match Thai F-16s. As "thanks" for his advises, he was relieved of command, demoted and transferred to the Myitkyina AB. He then protested and resigned too. In order not to make things worse, the government officials then approached him and offered him a lucrative job in the UMEH (Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings).

In total, the TL remains not combat capable: hardly 10-20% of its aircraft are flyable – stress is on “flyable”, not fully combat operational – on average. This, despite the government supposedly spending as much as 50% of the BNP for "defence"! There are strong reasons to believe that the situation changed considerably solely due to the arrival of MiG-29s: namely, the type is heavily dependable on support from the ground, without which it cannot effectively operate. In April 2001, with Chinese support Myanmar has built a new radar station on Zadetkale Island (also known as St. Luke’s Island), near the maritime border with Thailand, but this site is simply too far away from the focal points along the long border where the new fighters could be needed to challenge RTAF’s air superiority.

Burma acquired a total of ten MiG-29s from Russia, in 2001, including two two-seaters. It appears the acquizition of the type caused a number of TL's officers to resign in protest for government failing to acquire other fighters, such like Mirage 2000 or Su-27s. The type is in service with a single squadron, based at Shante AB, near Meiktila, and was rarely seen in public. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

An End of the War?

The situation at Mae Sai was finally solved through negotiations, even if initially both sides deployed additional forces in the area: in mid-February 2001 the Thai Army, for example, reinforced the elements of the 1st Armoured Division by parts of the 2nd Cavalry Division – equipped with M-41 Stingray tanks and V-150 armoured cars. On 14 February the RTAF also deployed a number of F-16s to Chaing Mai AB, and these flew constant air combat patrols along the border for the following two weeks. The situation remained tense, and on 10 May 2001 RTAF F-16s attacked targets in Kyauket area, in the Shon State: according to Myanmar sources, several objects in the villages of Gawli and Lawsansaw – both almost directly on the Thai border - were hit by several “rockets” in two waves. Rangoon protested strongly against these attacks, threatening to “take appropriate action to protect its national sovereignty and territory integrity”. No additional strikes are known to have been flown by either air force: instead, a series of negotiations followed, in which the then new Thai government managed to decrease tensions.

The “body-count" after the battle for Border Post 9631 was never published by either side, but some Thai sources indicate that the Tahan Pran alone were responsible for the death of up to 80 Myanmar soldiers, while - in total – the Thai side suffered one dead and 37 injured soldiers, as well as three killed civilians and seven wounded. Official Thai sources claimed that also two women were killed in attacks of Myanmar artillery against Mae Sai. Capt. Songkarn Nilphan later claimed that nearly 100 Myanmar troops were killed during this battle: even if he confirmed that Thai troops reported finding only three bodies inside the Post 9631, the Thais believed that many other bodies were taken back to Myanmar. On the Myanmari side, Col. Kyaw Thein, a senior intelligence office, confirmed that the Myanmar Army lost 12 troops killed and 15 wounded during these “border skirmishes”, but that these casualties were suffered only during the fighting against the Shon rebels – not against the Thais.

Certain is, however, that the SLORC suffered a considerable blow on 20 February, when a Mi-17 helicopter carrying several key military officers was shot down by a MANPAD fired either by the rebels of the Karen National Union (KNU) or the Shon United Revolution Army (SURA). Among the killed was Lt.Gen. Tion Oo, chief of staff of the Myanmar Army and former Commander of the TL, Col. Thein Nyunt, the Minister of Progress of border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, and Brig.Gen. Lun Maung. There are indications that the officers in question belonged to a fraction inside the SLORC junta, and that the helicopter was shot down for two reasons: a) because of fractional fighting, and b) because Lt.Gen. Tion Oo had to be “punished” after his plan and operations against Thailand failed.

[Zulu]

'DaehrS o&ufukd 0ifBunfhrdygw,f/ o&ufukd pwifwnfaxmifjyD; tcsuftvufawGukd pkpnf;ay;wJhukdabmh? eJh 0kdif;0ef;aqG;aEG;ay;wJholawGukd txl;aus;Zl;wifygw,f/ [kd;o&uf tprSm aqG;aEG;wJh ydGKifh 5 taBumif;yg/ od&oavmuf ydGKifh5 u pufaoewfvufvkdh qkd&rSmxuf av,Ofypf puf tajrmufvkdh qkd&rSm jzpfygw,f/ tJh'gukd a&Shwef;ppfajrjyifeJh? jrdKhwGif; wkdufyGJawGukd oHk;awmhvnf; vlwkdh opfyifwkdhqkd&if xufykdif; jywfoGm;wmayghcifAsm/ tJh'd toHBuD;ukd rSwfrdwmaygh/ ypfvkduf&if Akdif;Akdif; AHkAHk/ xHk;pHtwkdif; toHxufjrefawmh ypfwJhtoHu aemufrS Bum;&jyD; usnfaygufwJh toHu t&if Bum;&wmaygh/

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[chitpa]

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